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Summary
This article problematizes the legal concept of so-called hate speech in order 
to contribute to current debates on this complex and omnipresent social phe-
nomenon. Firstly, it refers to the provisions of various international human 
rights instruments relevant in the context of combating hate speech, provi-
ding general legal framework for the proper assessment of this issue. Then it 
discusses the legal concept of hate speech and certain controversies and dif-
ficulties involved. In particular, it points to the specific distinction that must 
be established and preserved between hate speech and other forms of hateful 
speech. Finally, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
concerning hate speech is analyzed by providing relevant examples from its 
case-law. In this connection, certain serious deficiencies in the ECtHR hate 
speech jurisprudence are indicated and briefly explained.
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1. Introduction
Hate speech is a highly complex social phenomenon. It is by no means a new phe-
nomenon. However, although known and existent in various forms of social or-
ganization throughout history, only during the 20th century (especially in the wake 
of WWII) it was recognized by the international community as a universal evil that 
should be restricted and suppressed by appropriate legal, political and educational 
means and measures. Various human rights agreements have been adopted at the 
international level in order to ensure certain fundamental rights and freedoms to 
all human beings without discrimination on the grounds such as race, colour, na-
tionality, sex, language, religion or other status. Principles/fundamental values of 
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inviolable human dignity, equality and non-discrimination are recognized as the 
cornerstones of modern democratic society constitution. Hate speech directly en-
dangers these fundamental principles/values. Owing to the rapid development of 
new means of communications in recent decades (the Internet, in the first place), 
hate speech has become a global phenomenon requiring comprehensive, coherent 
and harmonized response on the international and national levels. In recent years 
it has been the subject of fierce debates, among jurists in the European countries 
in particular.1 There are no final conclusions yet, and the debate over hate speech 
continues. Any meaningful discussion on the subject of hate speech and the re-
levant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in this re-
spect, however brief it may be, should, at least, take into consideration the fol-
lowing:
i) relevant international legal framework (i.e. specific provisions of the re-
levant international human rights instruments relating to (a) free speech 
guaranties, (b) provisions prohibiting discrimination on various grounds 
such as race, colour, religion, ethnicity, sex, age, language or other status, 
as well as (c) the prohibition of abuse clauses contained in those instru-
ments;
ii) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms (Convention) and in particular its Article 10 which guaran-
tees the right to freedom of expression and provides conditions for possible 
limitation of this right;
iii) interpretation and application of Article 10 of the Convention (concerning 
hate speech) as developed in the case-law of the ECtHR;
iv) ECtHR interpretation and application of Article 17 (abuse of rights clause) 
of the Convention in this context (i.e. in the context of hate speech juris-
prudence);
v) vital role of the media and journalists in a democratic society and special 
duties and responsibilities of media and journalists when disseminating 
hate speech statements of politicians and other participants in the public 
discourse;
vi) certain controversies and shortcomings of the ECtHR jurisprudence rela-
ting to hate speech.
1 Surprisingly, hate speech has not been the subject of serious debates among jurists in Croatia, 
although our public discourse is contaminated to a significant degree with various hate speech 
instances.
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2. International Legal Framework
At the outset, it should be noted that various international human rights instruments 
(universal and/or regional) do not contain, expressis verbis, the term hate speech. 
On the other hand, the term hate speech has been widely used in the documents 
(resolutions, recommendations, directives, reports etc.) of various international or-
ganizations, as well as in the decisions/judgments of international courts/commis-
sions/committees empowered to interpret and apply respective human rights instru-
ments.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 provides in Article 19: “Everyone has 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 29 states: “[...] (2) In the 
exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” 
Article 7 of the Declaration stipulates: “All are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 
any incitement to such discrimination.” Article 2 of the Declaration establishes: 
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. [...]” 
Finally, Article 30 prohibits abuse of the rights contained in the Declaration stating: 
“Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruc-
tion of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation3 in its Article 1(1) defines the term “racial discrimination”, rather widely, as 
“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, 
or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impair-
ing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field 
of public life”. In Article 2(1) State Parties commit themselves to “[...] pursue by 
all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimina-
2 Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948 (General As-
sembly resolution 217 A).
3 Adopted by the General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, entry into 
force 4 January 1969.
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tion in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races [...]”. In Article 
4 State Parties “[...] condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based 
on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or 
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimina-
tion in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed 
to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination [...]”, and specifically 
undertake to “[...] declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as 
all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons 
of another colour or ethnic origin [...]”.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 guarantees freedom of 
expression by Article 19: “1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions with-
out interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of 
art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided 
for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. 
It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as 
are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the rights or reputations of 
others; (b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or 
of public health or morals.” In Article 20 the Covenant prescribes: “1. Any propa-
ganda for war shall be prohibited by law. 2. Any advocacy of national, racial or reli-
gious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall 
be prohibited by law.” Provision of Article 2 of the Covenant provides, inter alia: 
“1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.” Finally, Article 5 of the Covenant states: “1. Nothing in the 
present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent 
than is provided for in the present Covenant.”
Similarly, American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)5 provides in Ar-
ticle 13 (freedom of thought and expression): “1. Everyone has the right to freedom 
4 Adopted by the General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into 
force 23 March 1976. 
5 Adopted at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, San José, Costa 
Rica, 22 November 1969, entry into force on 18 July 1978.
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of thought and expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice. 2. The exer-
cise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior 
censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall 
be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: a. respect for the 
rights or reputations of others; or b. the protection of national security, public order, 
or public health or morals. [...] 5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of na-
tional, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or 
to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds 
including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be consi-
dered as offenses punishable by law.”
By ratifying these documents, state parties accepted certain negative and posi-
tive commitments, depending on the rights and/or freedoms concerned. On the one 
hand, the states committed themselves not to interfere with the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed therein to a larger extent than necessary and proportionate in a demo-
cratic society for the protection of some other legitimate aims. On the other hand, to 
ensure (by various positive actions/measures, including legislative) undisturbed en-
joyment/exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed. These international agree-
ments and their respective relevant provisions, referenced and quoted above, are 
essential and indispensable for the proper understanding and consideration of the 
malign phenomenon of hate speech. They provide a kind of general horizon or 
background for the proper reflection on and meaningful approach to this pheno-
menon, both in legal theory and legal (legislative and court) practice. If this horizon 
is disregarded, this will inevitably lead to conceptual confusion in theory and unac-
ceptable, even absurd, results in (legislative and court) practice.
It is evident from the above-mentioned human rights documents that they: 
i) declare inviolable dignity inherent to all human beings, as well as their 
equality; 
ii) explicitly guarantee the right to freedom of expression to everyone; 
iii) establish preconditions for possible limitations to this right by providing 
an exhaustive list of so-called “legitimate aims” (i.e. certain individual and 
social values deserving protection in a democratic society, such as rights 
or reputations of others, national security, public order, or public health or 
morals); 
iv) explicitly exclude certain types/forms/contents of expression from the 
scope of the free speech guaranties (as exemplified above in the ACHR, 
Article 13);
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v) explicitly prohibit discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and free-
doms guaranteed on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status;
vi) explicitly prohibit the abuse of the rights and freedoms recognized in those 
instruments for the purpose of destruction or suppression of any of the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed.
It should be noted that the principle of equality and the principle of non-dis-
crimination are, undoubtedly, the most important principles (fundamental values) 
enshrined in the mentioned international human rights instruments. All other prin-
ciples/rights contained therein (including the right to freedom of expression) should 
be interpreted and applied in the light of these principles/rights. In fact, the principle 
of non-discrimination is derived from the principle of equality and both are rooted 
in and derived from the axiomatic determination/premise on the inherent and invio-
lable dignity of every human being. At the very least, it must be accepted that the 
right to equality, the right to non-discrimination and the right to freedom of expres-
sion/speech are the rights of the same legal status, deserving the same level of pro-
tection. Consequently, this allows the states a wider discretion in restricting various 
instances of so-called hate speech since this kind of public discourse, unlike various 
other forms of expression, is in direct conflict with the right to equality and the right 
to non-discrimination (as will be explained below).
If the protection afforded to freedom of expression is the main indicator of 
the democratic character of the particular society, then the respect of the principle 
of equality and protection against discrimination are the main indicators of its hu-
manity. In this context (i.e. in the context of discussion on hate speech) it should 
be emphasized and remembered that according to the mentioned international hu-
man rights instruments only certain forms/contents of public speech could/should 
be subject to strict legal limitations/prohibitions. Namely, only propaganda for war 
and advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to 
violence, hostility or discrimination against any person or group of persons on any 
ground (as it is stated in Article 13 of the ACHR) could and should as such be 
banned (i.e. prohibited by law) in a democratic society. All other forms of expres-
sion enjoy the protection in accordance with the free speech guaranties, i.e. fall 
within the scope of those guaranties.
3. Relevant Provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights
In a manner similar to the above-reviewed international human rights agreements, 
the European Convention on Human Rights,6 as the most important regional hu-
6 Adopted by the Council of Europe on 4 November 1950, entry into force on 3 September 1953.
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man rights instrument for the European countries, guarantees freedom of expression 
to everyone. Article 10 of the Convention states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
dom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without in-
terference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. [...]
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibili-
ties, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of na-
tional security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi-
dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
Additionally, Article 14 ensures the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms re-
cognized in the Convention “without discrimination on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”.7 Finally, Article 
17 prohibits the abuse of conventional rights and freedoms, stating: “Nothing in this 
Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right 
to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention”.
This Convention constitutes a sort of “Magna Carta” of human rights and fun-
damental liberties for the European countries, i.e. 47 member-states of the Coun-
cil of Europe.8 In this connection it should be pointed out that, quite similar to the 
7 Similarly, Protocol 12 to the European Convention provides general prohibition of discrimi-
nation in the enjoyment of any right set fort by (national) law (and not exclusively the rights re-
cognized in the Convention) (see: Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, open to signature on 4 November 2000, entry into force 
on 1 April 2005).
8 In this European context, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (200/C 
364/01) should also be mentioned. The Charter was proclaimed in December 2000 and became 
binding in December 2009. By its Article 1 the Charter declares that the human dignity is invio-
lable and must be respected and protected. By Article 11 it guarantees freedom of expression to 
everyone, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. Article 20 guarantees to 
everyone equality before the law. Article 21 prohibits any discrimination based on any ground. 
And Article 51, relating to the scope of guaranteed rights, stipulates that “any limitation on the 
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and 
respect the essence of those rights and freedoms” and, further, that “subject to the principle of 
proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objec-
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above-mentioned international human rights instruments, the Convention (i) gua-
rantees freedom of expression, providing conditions for possible limitations of this 
freedom, (ii) prohibits discrimination on any ground “such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status” and (iii) contains an “abuse 
of rights” clause. But, in contrast to those instruments, the Convention does not 
contain specific provision explicitly prohibiting certain kinds of expression which 
could be labeled as hate speech and, consequently, legally banned/restricted as 
such, i.e. “propaganda for war and advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred 
that constitute incitements to violence, hostility or discrimination against any per-
son or group of persons”.
4. General Remarks on the Legal Concept of Hate Speech
The fact that the Convention does not contain specific provision explicitly prohi-
biting hate speech complicates, to a significant degree, the ECtHR dealings with 
application relating to such matters and, consequently, makes its jurisprudence 
concerning the phenomenon of hate speech controversial, unforeseeable and li-
able to justified criticism. In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the 
issue of hate speech is undoubtedly one of the most complex issues in the field 
of freedom of expression in general, theoretically as well as practically. In recent 
years the issue of hate speech has been the subject of heated public debates in the 
European countries (Croatia included). Regrettably, these debates show that there 
is a lot of misunderstandings on the concept even among legal scholars, let alone 
among legal practitioners. There is no universal, commonly accepted definition of 
hate speech in legal theory. Various authors define hate speech differently. There 
is no need to provide and review the various definitions here. But despite all diffe-
rences in the definitions, there are certain common aspects in all of them. It could be 
argued that as far as legal theory is concerned the term hate speech has a relatively 
precise meaning. It embraces specific kinds of attacking speech which spread, pro-
mote and/or justify hatred, hostility, contempt, intolerance, exclusion, separation 
and prejudices and call for or incite violence and/or discrimination against certain 
identifiable and “vulnerable” groups and/or their members on account of their race, 
colour, national or ethnic origin, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender iden-
tives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others”. Finally, Article 54 (abuse of rights clause) states: “Nothing in this Charter shall be 
interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the de-
struction of any of the rights and freedoms recognised in this Charter or at their limitation to a 
greater extent than is provided for herein.”
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tity, health, disability, immigrant status or some other common characteristic or 
status.9
In sum, from the legal point of view two preconditions must be cumulatively 
met in order to attribute the label of hate speech to certain forms of expression: 
firstly, the content of the expression must be hateful, hostile, threatening, offensive, 
prejudicial, belittling, derogating, humiliating, dehumanizing...; secondly, such 
speech must be aimed at certain “vulnerable” groups and their members by promot-
ing, inciting or justifying hatred, hostility, violence and/or discrimination “against 
certain identifiable groups and/or individuals on account of their particular com-
mon characteristics” (such as race, sex, age, religion, health, disability, nationality, 
immigrant status, sexual orientation, gender identity or other status). Although the 
list of these “protected groups” is not exhaustive (as the term “other status” clearly 
confirms), it should not be extended ad limitum, so as to include all sorts of different 
social groups and their members (such as political parties, sport clubs, military, po-
lice forces, politicians, government, business enterprises, lawyers, judges, journa-
lists, members of particular professions etc.). “Protected identifiable groups” in this 
context should include only social groups which objectively are (or could be) sub-
ject to possible discrimination in society. In other words, only “vulnerable”, or his-
torically “victimized”, “deprived”, “oppressed” or “disadvantaged” groups should 
be legitimately protected from hate speech. These “vulnerable” groups represent, 
in principle, minority in society (such as various ethnic or religious minorities, gay 
persons etc.), but in exceptional cases it could even be a majority group (such as 
women or black people in certain apartheid societies). In both cases we are talking 
about “vulnerable”, or historically “victimized”/“disadvantaged” social groups and 
their members. This should always be borne in mind, so as to avoid and prevent 
utilization/misuse of hate speech legislation for illegitimate purposes, i.e. for the 
protection of social groups that represent the overwhelming majority in the society 
against the alleged hate speech of individuals and/or minority groups.
Sub specie iuris, hate speech must be clearly distinguished from various other 
forms/contents of hateful/offensive speech. The decisive feature/aspect of hate 
speech is not as much its “hateful/hostile/prejudicial” content (i.e. hateful emo-
tions emanated) as its intrinsic “discriminatory” character in relation to the vulne-
rable “group targeted”, i.e. its “discriminatory intention” directed against certain 
“vulnerable” groups and their members on account of their particular identity. It 
should be noted here that hatred is not always so easily recognizable and detect-
able in the various instances of hate speech. Hate speech can be articulated and 
9 See Alaburić, 2003. In this article, I suggested a similar definition of hate speech as provided 
herein.
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expressed in the form of scientific or pseudo-scientific writings without a trace 
of hatred on the surface. However, it still remains hate speech if it contains dis-
criminatory premises or shows discriminatory intentions towards certain vulnerable 
groups.
In contrast, hatred, animosity and/or hostility towards someone or something 
are the primary (if not exclusive) feature of hateful speech, recognizable at first 
sight. The principal target of hate speech is always a group, even if only an indivi-
dual member of the group is attacked. Moreover, it is (explicitly or implicitly) aimed 
at discrimination of the targeted group as such and, therefore, directly concerns all 
members of the group. On the other hand, hateful speech is, as a rule, aimed at and 
prejudicial to individuals (detrimental for their honor or reputation or some other 
personal rights). For example, if someone says that XY must or should not be al-
lowed to become a Minister in the Government, he possibly calls for discrimination 
of this particular person, but if someone says that XY, being a Serb, or Muslim, or 
gay, should not be allowed to become a Minister, then he calls for discrimination 
not only against particular persons, but against whole groups they belong to (and 
all of their members) as well. Additional reference to a person’s group identity sub-
stantially and, in my opinion, dramatically changes the context and the meaning of 
the speech, i.e. transforms otherwise hateful/hostile/discriminatory speech into hate 
speech in the legal sense of the term.
The term hate speech also covers speech that promotes, advocates or glorifies 
various social theories/ideologies/policies of race/ethnic supremacy, such as fascist 
and Nazi ideologies, as well as speech that approves, glorifies, justifies, minimizes 
or denies crimes committed by the fascists and Nazis during WWII (Holocaust and 
other crimes against humanity). This is logical and justified, since these ideologies 
are intrinsically racist and discriminatory. To summarize, hate speech is always, di-
rectly or indirectly, aimed at inciting discrimination against targeted social groups 
and their members on account of their particular common characteristics/identity. 
Its principal aim is to exclude, segregate, alienate, humiliate, dehumanize, intimi-
date and in the final analysis discriminate “vulnerable” social groups and their 
members and, consequently, deprive them of the human rights and freedoms gua-
ranteed or, at least, make the exercise of those rights substantially more difficult for 
them. By spreading hatred and hostility against such groups, haters create a social 
atmosphere/environment suitable/favorable to their discrimination.10
This discriminatory aspect of hate speech is clearly recognized by the EU Di-
rective implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective 
10 This could result, in most drastic cases, in their elimination from society, or even physical 
extermination (Holocaust, Ruanda genocide, Srebrenica genocide...).
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of racial or ethnic origin.11 It contains the following definition of “harassment”, as 
a special type of discrimination: “Harassment shall be deemed to be discrimination 
within the meaning of paragraph (Article) 1, when an unwanted conduct related to 
racial or ethnic origin takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity 
of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offen-
sive environment. In this context, the concept of harassment may be defined in ac-
cordance with the national laws and practice of the Member States” (Article 2(3)).12
Accordingly, speech can truly discriminate, even if it does not contain explicit 
instructions or incitement to discrimination. It is sufficient that it “violates dignity of 
a person” and “creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment” for certain vulnerable groups and their members. As argued before, 
hate speech must not be confounded with all kinds of hateful speech. Restrictions/
limitations imposed on hate speech require different/distinct legal foundation and 
justification from those concerning other forms/contents of speech (including hate-
ful speech). Considering fundamental values/principles/rights enshrined in various 
international human rights agreements and involved here (“human dignity, equality 
and non-discrimination”, as explained), the states enjoy a significantly wider mar-
gin of appreciation/discretion in restricting hate speech than is the case with other 
kinds of speech that are subject only to general limitation clauses contained in the 
provisions guaranteeing freedom of expression.13
Therefore, the legitimate principal aim/purpose/justification of hate speech 
laws could not be to make public discourse more decent, courteous, polite, civi-
lized, cultivated or even tolerant but to combat, suppress and restrict speech aimed 
at discrimination of individuals or groups based on their race, religion, national-
ity, origin, sex, sexual orientation, disability, age or other status, i.e. based on their 
particular distinct, historically, biologically, genetically or culturally conditioned 
identity, or “who they are”. That does not mean that the states are not entitled to 
11 Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000.
12 The Croatian Law on Suppression of Discrimination (Zakon o suzbijanju diskriminacije, NN 
85/08, 112/12) defines harassment in an almost identical manner (Article 3(1)). But unlike the 
EU Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial 
or ethnic origin, which relates, in the first place, to racial and ethnic discrimination, the Croatian 
Law significantly extends the list of protected groups by ensuring protection against discrimina-
tion (including harassment) based on “race, ethnicity or colour, sex, language, religion, political 
and other conviction, national or social origin, wealth, membership in syndicate, education, social 
status, marital or family status, age, health, disability, heredity, gender identity, expression or sexu-
al orientation” (Article 1).
13 Important note: this article does not discuss whether hate speech should be legally prohibited 
or not, and what legal means or modalities should or could be used and what legal standards ap-
plied in a democratic society to restrict such public speech.
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limit various kinds of hateful expression through their respective legislations relat-
ing to freedom of expression in general, but this must not be done under the pretext 
of combating hate speech and applying the same legal standards/restrictions.14 This 
would be a clear case of (mis)use of hate speech laws for illegitimate purposes.
In particular, governments must not use hate speech laws to shut the mouths 
of their opponents or critics, or to restrict public debate on various issues of public 
interest, or to repress unpopular ideas and opinions. States are allowed to impose 
certain limitations to free speech in general, but this must be done strictly within 
the limits of free speech guaranties, namely, only if it is with sufficient precision 
prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to the legiti-
mate aim(s) pursued. Democratic society should be able to cope with and tolerate 
a certain amount of hateful content in the public discourse without having to resort 
to criminal or disproportionate civil law sanctions. After all, in a truly democratic 
society citizens should have the right to freely express their negative feelings, dissa-
tisfaction, animosity, hostility and, in certain cases, even hatred towards various so-
cial occurrences, policies, measures, individuals or institutions (even if the words/
expressions used could be assessed as inappropriate, intolerant or unjustified).15
Considering all stated above, it is of the utmost importance, and one of the 
principal tasks of legal theory in this field, to provide a comprehensive and ope-
rational legal definition of hate speech which could be commonly accepted and 
applied through appropriate legislation and court practice. In this connection, the 
definition of hate speech contained in the Recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States on “Hate Speech” could be relevant for the member 
states of the Council of Europe.16 Despite of its serious deficiencies it could serve 
as a relevant starting point for legislators and courts in dealing with the instances of 
hate speech. According to this definition, the term hate speech covers “all forms of 
expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-
Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance ex-
pressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility 
against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin” (Appendix to Recom-
mendation [Scope]). Consequently, hate speech relates to and encompasses specific 
forms of expression that: (i) spread, (ii) incite, (iii) promote and/or (iv) justify “ha-
tred based on intolerance” against certain social groups and their members (specifi-
cally mentioning racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, aggressive nationalism, 
14 Hate speech laws usually involve serious criminal sanctions.
15 Such speech could be combated by various measures (educational in the first place), including 
appropriate and balanced legal provisions, but it should not be repressed by resorting to sweep-
ing provisions of hate speech laws.
16 Recommendation No. R (97) 20, adopted on 30 October 1997.
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ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities and immigrants, but 
the list is not exhausted).
Member states of the Council of Europe are recommended to establish a legal 
framework consisting of civil, criminal and administrative law provisions on hate 
speech. With regard to criminal sanctions, the Recommendation warns that these 
sanctions generally constitute serious interference with the freedom of expression 
and therefore the principle of proportionality has to be respected strictly (Appen-
dix/Principle 2). The Recommendation further states that national law and practice 
should take due account of the role of the media in communicating information and 
ideas which expose, analyze and explain specific instances of hate speech and the 
underlying phenomenon in general, as well as the right of the public to receive such 
information and ideas. National law and practice should, therefore, clearly distin-
guish between the responsibility of the authors of expression of hate speech, on the 
one hand, and any responsibility of the media and media professionals contributing 
to their dissemination as part of their mission to communicate information and ideas 
on matters of public interest, on the other hand (Appendix/Principle 6).
5. ECtHR Jurisprudence Concerning Hate Speech (Case-law Examples)
It must be reminded, in this connection, that unlike some other international hu-
man rights instruments (as explained above), the European Convention on Human 
Rights does not contain specific provision(s) explicitly prohibiting certain forms of 
expression which could be deemed as hate speech and legally restricted as such. 
Expectedly and admittedly, that makes the work of the ECtHR more difficult and 
to a certain degree open to arbitrariness. In consideration of applications based on 
the alleged violation of the right to freedom of expression (including those relating 
to hate speech) the ECtHR applies Article 10 (guaranteeing freedom of expression) 
and Article 17 of the Convention (prohibiting abuse of conventional rights and free-
doms).
Guillotine Effect of Article 17 in the Practice of the ECtHR
Article 17 of the Convention represents the so-called “abuse of rights” clause, pro-
hibiting misuse of the Conventional rights and freedoms for the purposes of de-
stroying those rights and freedoms.17 Pursuant to Article 35 of the Convention “the 
Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application if it considers that the 
application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto or manifestly ill-founded”. A significant number of applications concern-
17 The other international human rights instruments referenced above contain a similar provi-
sion.
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ing hate speech instances submitted pursuant to Article 10 of the Convention has 
been declared inadmissible by the ECtHR by invoking precisely Article 17 of the 
Convention which prohibits abuse of conventional rights, i.e. activities and acts 
“aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Con-
vention or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Conven-
tion”. In other words, the majority of applications relating to various instances of 
so-called hate speech has been disposed of, as a rule, at the admissibility phase of 
the proceedings, and declared inadmissible ratione materiae by applying Article 17 
of the Convention. The ECtHR refused to consider such applications (i.e. to issue 
judgments on the merits) and they have been, de facto and de iure, excluded from 
the scope of Article 10 protection. Holocaust denial, revisionism of the historical 
facts of WWII, anti-Semitism, denying the crimes against humanity committed by 
the Nazis, activities of various paramilitary groups, attempts to revive the Fascist 
party, as well as some other forms of prima facie racial or religious hatred (espe-
cially islamofobia) have been consistently excluded from the protection of Article 
10.
The following cases are examples of such practice:
Pavel Ivanov v. Russia:18 The applicant “authored and published a series of 
articles portraying Jews as the source of evil in Russia, calling for their exclusion 
from social life”, accusing this ethnic group of plotting a conspiracy against Rus-
sian people and ascribing “Fascist ideology to the Jewish leadership”. He was con-
victed for public incitement to ethnic, racial and religious hatred. “The application 
was declared inadmissible by the ECtHR, for such general, vehement attack on one 
ethnic group is directed against the Convention’s underlying values such as tole-
rance, social peace and non-discrimination.”
Garaudy v. France:19 The Court considered that the content of the book The 
Founding Myths of Modern Israel “had amounted to Holocaust denial and pointed 
out that denying crimes against humanity was one of the most serious forms of ra-
cial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them”. The Court concluded 
that “the real purpose was to rehabilitate the National Socialist regime and accuse 
victims of falsifying history”. These acts are manifestly incompatible with the core 
values of the Convention and therefore Article 17 was applied and application de-
clared inadmissible.
Norwood v. UK:20 “The applicant had displayed in his window a poster sup-
plied by the British National Party, of which he was a member, representing the Twin 
18 ECtHR, application no. 35222/04, decision of 20 February 2007.
19 ECtHR, application no. 65831/01, decision of 24 June 2003.
20 ECtHR, application no. 23131/03, decision of 16 November 2004.
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Towers in flame. The picture was accompanied by the words ‘Islam out of Britain – 
Protect the British People’. He was convicted of aggravated hostility towards a reli-
gious group.” The Court declared the application inadmissible (incompatible ratione 
materiae with the Convention) invoking Article 17 and found that such a general, 
vehement attack against a religious group, linking the group as a whole with a grave 
act of terrorism, was incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the 
Convention, notably tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination.
Abedin Smajic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina:21 The applicant, a Bosnian lawyer, 
wrote a number of posts on a publicly accessible Internet forum in which he de-
scribed military action to be undertaken against Serb villages and neighborhoods in 
the Brcko District in the event of war caused by the Republika Srpska. The Court 
notes that the subject of the applicant’s posts, even if written in a hypothetical form, 
had touched “upon very sensitive matter of the ethnic relations in post-conflict Bos-
nian society”. Expressions used were highly insulting towards Serbs and the com-
plaint was declared inadmissible, manifestly ill-founded, and it was rejected.
Application of Article 17 in the ECtHR jurisprudence concerning Article 10 
was, to say the least, arguable, for various reasons. Firstly, Article 17 explicitly re-
fers to “acts and activities”, which could be reasonably interpreted as and applied to 
“deeds”, not words. Secondly, such broad interpretation (and application) of Article 
17 allowed the judges a too wide margin of discretion, bordering on arbitrariness. 
Thirdly, in cases concerning Article 10 it should be used (if at all) only in excep-
tional/extreme cases which are prima facie manifestly ill-founded, i.e. incompatible 
with the provisions of the Convention (such as direct incitement to war, violence 
or discrimination against specific groups); all other forms/contents of expression 
should be covered by the protection provided for in Article 10 of the Convention 
and duly considered in the judgments, strictly applying the well known three-part 
test of legality, legitimacy and necessity/proportionality of the disputed interference 
in democratic society. Admittedly, the ECtHR has obviously been aware of the con-
troversies inevitably implied and involved in such application of Article 17 since, in 
recent years, it invoked relatively sparingly Article 17 as the basis for dismissal of 
applications concerning Article 10 of the Convention.
Application of Article 10 in Cases Involving Hate Speech
All applications concerning hate speech have been submitted pursuant Article 10 
of the Convention alleging violation of the rights to freedom of expression gua-
ranteed therein. A number of those applications have been declared admissible and 
duly considered by the ECtHR in the respective judgments. The ECtHR assessed 
21 ECtHR, application no. 48657/16, decision of 8 February 2018.
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specific circumstances of each particular case in the light of guarantees contained in 
paragraph 1 of Article 10. Since the right to freedom of expression is not an absolute 
right but is subject to certain limitations in a democratic society (“in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi-
dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”, as provi-
ded in paragraph 2 of Article 10), the ECtHR applies, to the specific circumstances 
of each case, so-called three-part test. It establishes (a) whether the impugned re-
striction has been prescribed by law, (b) whether it has pursued a legitimate aim 
and, finally, (c) whether the impugned restriction has been necessary in a demo-
cratic society and proportionate for the protection of the legitimate aim pursued.
Two cases are significant and indicative with regard to the scope of general 
protection afforded by Article 10. In the Handyside v. UK case22 the Court pointed 
out, more than 40 years ago: “Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential 
foundations of such a [democratic] society, one of the basic conditions for its pro-
gress and for the development of every man”. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, 
“it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favorably received or 
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, 
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of 
that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democra-
tic society.” On the other hand, in Erbakan v. Turkey23 the Court pointed out “that 
combating all forms of intolerance was an integral part of human-rights protection” 
and “that it was crucially important that in their speeches politicians should avoid 
making comments likely to foster such intolerance”. The Court considers not only 
the content of the speech, but the case as a whole. Namely, it considers content of 
the statement, context, intention or the aim of the applicant, status of the author, 
public concerned, form, impact of the speech and all other relevant circumstances 
of the case. All relevant elements are combined and assessed on a case-by-case ba-
sis. Depending on the particular circumstances of each case, the ECtHR may find 
violation or non-violation of Article 10.
The following cases could serve as indicative examples of this practice:
Lehideux and Isorni v. France:24 Lehideux was Minister for Industrial Produc-
tion in the Government of Marshal Pétain from September 1940 to April 1942. He 
was the president of the Association for the Defence of the Memory of Marshal 
22 ECtHR, application no. 5493/72, judgement of 7 December 1976, para. 49.
23 ECtHR, application no. 59405/00, judgement of 6 July 2006.
24 ECtHR, application no. 24662/94, judgement of 23 September 1998.
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Pétain. Isorni, attorney at law, was officially appointed to assist the President of 
the Bar Association in defending Marshal Pétain at his trial before the High Court 
of Justice. In August 1945, the High Court of Justice sentenced Philippe Pétain to 
death for collusion with Germany with a view to furthering the designs of the ene-
my. Isorni was the author of the advertisement published in the daily Le Monde 
bearing the title “People of France, you have short memories”. The text recapitula-
ted, in a series of assertions, the main stages of Philippe Pétain’s life as a public fi-
gure from 1916 to 1945, presenting his actions, first as a soldier and later as French 
Head of State, in a positive light. Lehideux and Isorni were sentenced for public 
defence of the crime of collaboration with the enemy. In contrast to French courts, 
the ECtHR found that France violated Article 10. It stated, inter alia: 47. “[...] The 
Court considers that it is not its task to settle this point, which is part of an ongoing 
debate among historians about the events in question and their interpretation. As 
such, it does not belong to the category of clearly established historical facts – such 
as the Holocaust – whose negation or revision would be removed from the protec-
tion of Article 10 by Article 17. In the present case, it does not appear that the appli-
cants attempted to deny or revise what they themselves referred to in their publica-
tion as ‘Nazi atrocities and persecutions’ or ‘German omnipotence and barbarism’. 
In describing Philippe Pétain’s policy as ‘supremely skillful’, the authors of the text 
were rather supporting one of the conflicting theories in the debate about the role of 
the head of the Vichy government, the so-called ‘double game’ theory.” And further: 
“55. [...] The Court (further) notes that the events referred to in the publication in is-
sue had occurred more than forty years before. Even though remarks like those the 
applicants made are always likely to reopen the controversy and bring back memo-
ries of past sufferings, the lapse of time makes it inappropriate to deal with such 
remarks, forty years on, with the same severity as ten or twenty years previously. 
That forms part of the efforts that every country must make to debate its own history 
openly and dispassionately.”
Sürek (no. 1) v. Turkey:25 The applicant was the owner of a political weekly 
which published two readers’ letters condemning military actions of the Turkish 
authorities against Kurdish population “in south-east Turkey and accusing them 
of brutal suppression of the Kurdish people in their struggle for independence and 
freedom”. Domestic courts convicted him, in accordance with the Turkish Criminal 
Code, for the criminal offence of “disseminating propaganda against the indivisibi-
lity of the State and provoking enmity and hatred among the people”. The ECtHR 
found “that there had been no violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression). It no-
ted that the impugned letters amounted to an appeal to bloody revenge and that one 
of them had identified persons involved in military operations by name, exposing 
25 ECtHR, application no. 26682/95, judgement of 8 July 1999 (Grand Chamber).
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them to the possible risk of physical violence”. In the assessment of the Court the 
applicant’s conviction has been justified and proportional in a democratic society.
Feret v. Belgium:26 “The applicant was a Belgian member of the Parliament and 
chairman of the political party Front National. During the election campaign, seve-
ral types of leaflets were distributed carrying slogans including ‘Stand up against 
the Islamification of Belgium’, ‘Stop the sham integration policy’ and ‘Send non-
European job-seekers home’. The applicant was convicted of incitement to racial 
discrimination. He was sentenced to community service and was disqualified from 
holding parliamentary office for 10 years. He alleged a violation of his right to free-
dom of expression. The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 10 
for the applicant’s comments had clearly been liable to arouse feelings of distrust, 
rejection or even hatred towards foreigners and thus clearly amounted to incitement 
to racial hatred. The applicant’s conviction had been justified in a democratic soci-
ety in the interests of preventing disorder and protecting the rights of others, namely 
members of the immigrant community.”
Vejdeland and others v. Sweden:27 “This case concerned the applicants’ con-
viction for distributing in an upper secondary school approximately 100 leaflets” 
(by leaving them in the school lockers) offensive to homosexuals. The leaflets con-
tained “allegations that homosexuality was a ‘deviant sexual proclivity’, had ‘a 
morally destructive effect on the substance of society’ and was responsible for the 
development of HIV and AIDS... The Court found that these statements had consti-
tuted serious and prejudicial allegations, even if they had not been a direct call to 
hateful acts. The Court stressed that discrimination based on sexual orientation was 
as serious as discrimination based on race, origin or colour. It concluded that there 
had been no violation of Article 10.”
Leroy v. France:28 The applicant, a cartoonist, published a drawing in a Basque 
weekly newspaper “representing the attack on the twin towers of the World Trade 
Center of 11 September 2001 with a caption imitating the advertising slogan of a 
famous brand: ‘We all dreamt of it... Hamas did it’”. He has been fined by the do-
mestic courts. The ECtHR found no violation of Article 10. It considered, inter alia, 
that the applicant supported and glorified violent destruction of the twin towers and 
diminished the dignity of the victims.
Soulas and others v. France:29 The applicants have been convicted for inciting 
violence against Muslim communities from northern and central Africa following 
26 ECtHR, application no. 15615/07, judgement of 16 July 2009.
27 ECtHR, application no. 1813/07, judgement of 9 February 2012.
28 ECtHR, application no. 36109/03, judgement of 2 October 2008.
29 ECtHR, application no. 15948/03, judgement of 10 July 2008.
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the publication of the book with the title The Colonisation of Europe, and the sub-
title “Truthful remarks about immigration and Islam”. The ECtHR found no vio-
lation of Article 10. It accepted, as relevant and sufficient, the arguments of the 
French courts that the content of the book and the terms used were intended to give 
rise in readers to a feeling of rejection and hostility against the Muslim communities 
as the main enemy in a future war of ethnic re-conquest. 
Perincek v. Switzerland:30 The applicant was a Turkish politician who publicly 
expressed the view, in Switzerland, “that the mass deportations and massacres suf-
fered by the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the following years had 
not amounted to genocide. The Swiss courts held in particular that his motives ap-
peared to be racist and nationalistic and that his statements did not contribute to the 
historical debate. The applicant complained that his criminal conviction and punish-
ment had been in breach of his right to freedom of expression. The Court held that 
there had been a violation of Article 10.” It concluded that it had not been necessary 
“to subject the applicant to a criminal sanction in order to protect the rights of the Ar-
menian community”. The Court emphasized: “expression on matters of public inter-
est is in principle entitled to strong protection, whereas expression that promotes or 
justifies violence, hatred, xenophobia or another form of intolerance cannot normally 
claim protection” (para. 230).31
In addition to the above-mentioned cases and examples, we can outline at least 
a couple of other important cases particularly relevant when discussing the relation-
ship between hate speech and media relative to the application of Article 10 of the 
Convention. These are: 
Jersild v. Denmark:32 The case is significant and exemplary in this context. The 
applicant was a Danish journalist convicted for aiding and abetting members of the 
racist group called Greenjackets in making abusive and derogatory remarks and 
racist comments by broadcasting their views. Some of these racist comments were: 
“niggers... are not human beings, they are animals”, “just take a picture of a gorilla, 
30 ECtHR, application no. 27510/08, judgement of 15 October 2015.
31 Denial of the crime of genocide committed in Srebrenica is the topic of the current heated 
public debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Some Serb politicians deny the existence 
of genocidal intention, and accordingly the commitment of the crime of genocide in Srebrenica, 
although they do not deny that crimes of murder of thousands Muslim men had been committed. 
In this context, the following conclusion of the Court in the Perincek case should be mentioned: 
“[...] [G]enocide justification does not consist in assertions that a particular event did not consti-
tute a genocide, but in statements which express a value judgment about it, relativizing its gra-
vity or presenting it as right. The Court does not consider that the applicant’s statements could 
be regarded as bearing this meaning; nor could they be regarded as justifying any other crimes 
against humanity” (para. 240).
32 ECtHR, application no. 15890/89, judgement of 23 September 1994.
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man, and then look at a nigger, it’s the same body structure and everything, man, 
flat forehead and all kinds of things...”. The program was broadcasted in the con-
text of a serious public debate on anti-immigration movements in Denmark. Based 
on this and other circumstances of the case, the Court concluded that the penalty/
restriction imposed on the journalist by Dutch courts violated Article 10 of the Con-
vention, stating:
35. News reporting based on interviews, whether edited or not, constitutes one of 
the most important means whereby the press is able to play its vital role of “public 
watchdog” [...]. The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination 
of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the 
contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not 
be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so. In this re-
gard the Court does not accept the Government’s argument that the limited nature 
of the fine is relevant; what matters is that the journalist was convicted. There can 
be no doubt that the remarks in respect of which the Greenjackets were convicted 
[...] were more than insulting to members of the targeted groups and did not en-
joy the protection of Article 10 [...]. However, even having regard to the manner 
in which the applicant prepared the Greenjackets item [...], it has not been shown 
that, considered as a whole, the feature was such as to justify also his conviction 
of, and punishment for, a criminal offence under the Penal Code.
36. It is moreover undisputed that the purpose of the applicant in compiling the 
broadcast in question was not racist. [...]
Delfi AS v. Estonia:33 This was the first case relating to the Internet, i.e. to the 
responsibility of the commercial news portals for the content of their websites. The 
applicant company which runs a new portal has been held liable (and sanctioned 
with a moderate fine of 320 E) by domestic courts for the offensive comments 
posted by the readers of the news portal below its article about disputable business 
practices of one ferry company. It is important to mention that the news portal re-
moved disputable comments after six weeks “at the request of the lawyers of the 
owner of the ferry company”. The ECtHR found no violation of Article 10. It held 
that the majority of the impugned comments published under the news portal article 
amounted to an incitement to hatred and/or violence against the owner of the ferry 
company. The Court established responsibility (pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 
10) of the Internet news portal for the clearly unlawful content published, especial-
ly if generated comments amounted to hate speech and incitement to violence or 
“direct threats to the physical integrity of individuals”. Considering all aspects and 
circumstances of the case, the Court held that the restrictions imposed on the appli-
cant company have been justified and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.
33 ECtHR, application no. 64569/09, judgement of 16 June 2015.
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6. Concluding Remarks Concerning the ECtHR Hate Speech 
Jurisprudence
The ECtHR jurisprudence concerning hate speech is still unsettled. It is by no means 
uncontroversial. Certain decisions and/or judgments/decisions concerning particular 
instances of hateful expressions, including those that reasonably fall under the no-
tion of hate speech (within the meaning explained above), have been disputed by 
legal scholars and legal practitioners. On the other hand, there are judgments that 
have been commonly accepted and praised as well-reasoned and justified. It clearly 
follows from the relevant ECtHR case-law that certain forms/contents of “hate” or 
“hateful” speech enjoy a rather narrow scope of protection, if any, under Article 10 
of the Convention. In particular those relating to Holocaust denials, promotion of 
fascist/Nazi ideologies or various terrorist activities, as well as those amounting to 
incitement to hatred, discrimination and/or violence against certain groups and their 
members. Some other forms/contents of hate speech enjoy a wider scope of protec-
tion in accordance with Article 10 guarantee and legal standards developed in the 
relevant ECtHR jurisprudence. It is also evident from its case-law that the ECtHR 
recognizes the vital role of the media and journalists in a democratic society in dis-
seminating all information of public interest, including those relating to hate speech 
instances, bearing in mind the right of the public to receive this information. There-
fore, such role of the media and media professionals must be respected and protected 
by national authorities. But the media and journalists are expected to exercise special 
caution when they disseminate information and ideas that could be deemed as hate 
speech, including those inciting hatred, violence or discrimination against certain 
groups or individuals, to ensure they do not become instruments of various groups or 
individuals in spreading and promoting those ideas.
However, it should be noted that the ECtHR jurisprudence regarding hate 
speech instances suffers from serious deficiencies:
i) invoking Article 17 of the Convention as the legal basis for dismissal of 
applications concerning Article 10 is a highly problematic practice open 
to justified criticism; the principal purpose of Article 17 (prohibition of 
abuse of rights) is to protect the democratic organization of the state/society 
against groups and individuals invoking conventional rights and freedoms 
with the aim of undermining them; the ECtHR jurisprudence concerning in-
terpretation and application of Article 17 does not provide clear criteria for 
determining which activities/acts/conducts reasonably fall within the ambit 
of Article 17 and that makes this jurisprudence inconsistent and to a signifi-
cant extent arbitrary; when “speech” (not conduct) is concerned, Article 17 
should be used, if at all, only in the most exceptional cases (directly calling 
for or inciting violence against certain vulnerable groups); in all other hate 
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speech cases Article 10 should be applied, including limitations provided 
therein, in conjunction (where appropriate in the circumstances of the case) 
with Article 14 of the Convention and Protocol 12;
ii) the lack of a coherent, comprehensive and operational definition34 of hate 
speech is the most serious deficiency of the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence; 
the ECTHR case-law blurs the crucially important distinction between hate 
speech and some other forms of hateful expressions (as explained above); 
in consequence, the ECtHR assessment of hate speech is primarily based on 
the (offensive/attacking/hostile/vulgar) words used, not on the (discrimi-
natory) ideas conveyed; absent of a comprehensive definition, the ECtHR 
case-by-case approach in dealing with particular instances of hate speech 
is inconsistent, unpredictable and practically doomed to confusion and ar-
bitrariness; 
iii) the lack of a hate speech definition allowed the ECtHR an unacceptably 
wide interpretation and application of the term “other status”, contained 
in the non-discrimination provisions (of the Convention and other relevant 
international human rights instruments); this term has been widened ad ab-
surdum in the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence, so as to include not only cer-
tain “vulnerable” groups and their members explicitly mentioned in those 
provisions, but virtually all different social groups based on grounds such 
as membership in the police or military force, business enterprise, organi-
zation, marital status, parenthood, place of residence etc.; such interpreta-
tion of the term “other status” in the context of hate speech jurisprudence 
additionally contributes to confusion;
iv) the lack of a coherent and comprehensive definition of hate speech is even 
more relevant bearing in mind that one of the essential roles of the ECtHR 
and its case-law is to contribute to the harmonization of legislative and 
judicial practices in the field of human rights and freedoms among the 
CoE member-states, i.e. to provide clear (as possible) guidelines through 
its case-law to national legislators and domestic courts in implementing the 
Convention, especially with regard to such a precious and for a democratic 
society so important freedom – freedom of expression; in this respect the 
ECtHR case-law does not help much in establishing common legal princi-
ples and applicable legal standards.
Hopefully this will change, and these insufficiencies will be corrected in due 
time. The sooner, the better.
34 Every definition is a limitation.
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